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Abstract
In markets with thousands of products, firms cannot take it for granted that con-
sumers are even aware of their articles’ existence. Advertising and actions to attract
consumer attention are therefore integral components of a firm’s competitive toolbox.
We study firms’ behavior in a perfect example for such a market: The music indus-
try, in which consumers can choose from a plethora of albums and songs. We study
a specific strategic instrument of firms, single releases, applying unique micro-level
data. Arguing that the digitization of the industry via MP3, filesharing, and iTunes
amounts to forced unbundling, the role of singles has changed from individual rev-
enue generators (pre-digital era) to pure attention gatherers. In accordance with this
driving hypothesis, we observe an inverse U-shaped relationship between competition
intensity and the number of singles released in the digital era, while previously com-
petition had a purely negative effect.
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1 Introduction
Firms compete along multiple dimensions, in particular, price, quality, and consumer
attention. In markets with a multitude of products, the costs of information acquisition
for consumers are substantial; therefore, capturing and retaining consumer interest is of
particular importance. This is of special relevance in entertainment markets due to the
large variety of offerings in film and television programmes, video games, smartphone
applications, books and music. In such settings, consumers cannot possibly be aware of
every offering that exists, so that producers must muscle for their attention. In that vein,
Loudness War generally refers to the practise of ramping up the audio levels on music
recordings in the belief that it will make tracks more appealing (or at least noticeable) to
listeners. The idea is that, especially on the radio, louder songs stand out, and attract
consumers’ notice more easily.
As we argue in this paper, a loudness war is also at work in a further sense, since the music
industry has become digitized. Music singles are potential individual sources of revenue.
Prior to the rise of phenomena such as MP3, filesharing, and iTunes, single releases were at
the same time spinoffs of these products from the underlying album and thereby equivalent
to partial unbundling. Now, changes to the industry, in particular the digital revolution,
have inverted the standard: Immediately upon an album being released, consumers can
purchase each individual track – a (forced) unbundling of albums has taken place. In this
paper, we argue that this has fundamentally changed the role of single releases in the
strategic arsenal of record labels. In the digital era, they have mainly become discrete,
observable advertising events to garner attention for the underlying album – a further
battlefield in the loudness war. They are effective via the channel of radio airplay, which
is one of the central determinants for music purchase decisions, which, in turn, is strongly
contingent on a song being released as a single (see, e.g. Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2004).1
Competition along the dimensions of price and quality has been extensively studied, both
theoretically and empirically. How firms compete for attention, on the other hand, is
still less well understood. Also using the music industry as an application, Hendricks
and Sorensen (2009a) show how consumer awareness and information affect purchasing
1Accordingly, record labels (and artists) have close ties to radio stations (Vogel, 1986; Caves, 2000).
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behavior and the success of products; this may depend on gathering external information
(Cai et al., 2009; Tucker and Zhang, 2011; Hendricks et al., 2012). Firms can influence the
information available to consumers by their activities including advertising. Intriguingly,
singles can mostly be assigned to a certain album, which therefore allows us to derive
insights into product-specific advertising decisions at the micro-level. The idea that firms
use advertising to transmit information is well accepted (Telser, 1964; Nelson, 1970).2
Through informative advertising firms can, either directly or through signalling, com-
municate their existence (Haan and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2011). Various studies have shown
that the primary effect of advertisements is that of informing consumers (Ackerberg, 2001,
2003).3 Single releases, through the increased airplay that they entail and (at least origi-
nally) by giving consumers the opportunity to sample the work of a band (Halbheer et al.,
forthcoming), can be solidly placed in the realm of informational advertising.
To inform our empirical exercise, we propose a simple mechanism to elucidate the tradeoff
that firms face and from which we derive testable hypotheses. After the initial release of
a product, it is noticed by consumers at a rate that decays over time, which we define
as attention. Through discrete activities, the firm can “refresh” attention for its product.
In the digital era, single releases are guided mainly by this attention gathering calculus.
Previously, in the era of the “Maxi CD”, single releases were associated with the partial
unbundling of products – firms therefore had to take additional effects of unbundling
individual songs from the album into account. Since the time-dimension of our data
engulfs both eras, we can use the increasing importance of the digital distribution and
sales channel to try to disentangle the effects of unbundling and attention gathering: In
the current era, for the vast majority of digitally released albums, customers can purchase
any given song separately, whether or not it was released as a single, which is equivalent
to forced unbundling ex ante. Clearly, other factors change over time that affect the
single-release calculus of firms, such as cost structures, music consumption behavior, etc.
Therefore we consider the release behavior through the lens of competition: Firms should
react to stronger competition differently when only competing for attention through single
2See Vakratsas and Ambler (1999) for an overview of research on how advertising influences customers.
3The alternative (or complementary) view of advertising emphasizes its persuasive effect, see, e.g., Dixit
and Norman (1978); Bloch and Manceau (1999).
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releases than if unbundling directly affects revenues, for any given cost structure. We derive
these systematic differences and take them to the data.
As a result, we demonstrate how a changing market environment and new sales channels
affect the strategic (advertising) behavior of firms. Our empirical analysis is based on a
rich dataset from the large online music platform MusicBrainz.org. The data offer ample
sources of variation, with monthly releases varying substantially across countries, genres
and time.
In the setting in which single releases are mostly informative instead of independent sources
of revenues, we find that competition has an inverted U-shaped effect on the number of
released singles. This corresponds to our theoretical framework in which competition is
associated with a faster decay of consumer attention, leading returns to advertising to
decrease beyond a certain optimal point. Our results further show that the time-intervals
between releases are strictly decreasing in competition; competition leads record labels
to fight harder for attention and to use their instruments more frequently. During the
earlier period, the business model of singles as an independent revenue source was still
(mostly) intact and single releases must be understood as partial unbundling of songs from
an album. Corresponding to our theoretical framework, for the earlier time period, we
do not observe an inverted U-shaped effect of competition on single releases; the number
is strictly decreasing in competition. This lends empirical support to the idea that the
digitization of music distribution changed the nature of the single, and thereby the nature
of competition in the music industry.
2 Industry Background and Hypotheses
In the following, we develop a simple framework to derive and motivate the central hy-
potheses that will inform the subsequent empirical analysis. In the music industry, firms
generate two (very similar) products simultaneously: singles and albums. In principle,
both of these are sources of revenues for the firm, although the role of singles in this re-
gard is dwindling.4 The music industry is a good representative of the digital economy:
4According to 2012 data from the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), US album sales
(digital, CD, vinyl) accounted for 3.85 billion USD, which is 70% of the total market, compared to 1.63
billion USD from single sales (digital, CD, vinyl). However, measured in units, singles accounted for 81%
of all sales, with 1.39 billion units, compared to 0.32 billion album units.
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There is an ongoing flood of new products and releases5 raining down on consumers, who
have to sift through the information overflow to find what they like. Correspondingly,
product life-cycles tend mostly to be short, which allows us, the researchers, to observe
them entirely. Firms compete for consumer awareness and try to make optimal use of the
tools at their disposal.
2.1 Awareness for a product over time
A firm tries to sell its product to a group of consumers with mass M , who are originally not
aware of the product’s existence. The product is a music album, which is composed of N
tracks that can potentially be individually released and marketed as singles. Assume that if
the firm simply releases its product at t = 0 and then remains passive, a consumer is aware
of the product at a given point in time with probability 0 ≤ f(t, .) < 1, which depends on
the time since release t and other factors. An aware consumer then decides whether or not
to purchase the album, depending on her type, as discussed in the following section. The
rate at which consumers take note of the product is decreasing in time: The original buzz
surrounding the album release dissipates and on average interest in the product (e.g.,
manifested in radio airplay, TV features and newspaper or magazine articles) tends to
decay. By time t, in expectation a total of M
∫ t
0 f(t)dt consumers have noticed the album.
However, the firm can generate additional buzz for its product by releasing a new single.
Radio-stations in practice predominantly feature the album’s latest single in their pro-
gram.6 For simplicity, imagine that a single release “resets” the rate at which consumers
become aware of the product to f(0, .), as illustrated in the left-hand panel of figure 1.
The release of a single is costly, with the firm incurring marketing outlays vis-a-vis news
media, radio and TV stations (Caves, 2000), the time and effort of the artist in promoting
the song, in addition to the costs of physical production. The firm will release an additional
single only as long as the benefits outweigh these costs.
Now consider the benefits of such a measure from the perspective of attention gathering.
In choosing whether and when to release a single, the firm considers the rate at which
5In the US alone, 75.000 albums were released in the year 2010, according to market research firm Nielsen,
see http://tinyurl.com/nd2hsfg.
6Using song-level data from 2,000 radio stations from 2004 to 2008, Waldfogel (2012) shows that airplay is
largely skewed towards new releases. 29% of all played songs are not older than two years.
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Figure 1: Attention decay, activity implementation, and competition
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attention decays as well as the market size M of potential customers. In our setup, the
most effective use of an attention gathering measure — i.e., the most consumers will be
reached by the original album plus the single — is to release it once f(t) has fallen to 0. A
release before this point means that the previous release is still generating attention on its
own. Note however, that this behavior is only optimal, if the firm does not discount profits;
if firms are impatient, there is an incentive to reach consumers sooner rather than later,
and the optimal release date of singles will be earlier. The basic mechanism remains, i.e.
to wait until the additionally generated attention from the single is large enough. M also
affects the behavior of the firm — the larger the market, the more potential customers can
be reached and the more likely it is that the expenditures for an additional single release
will be recuperated. By the same logic, once most consumers in the market were aware of
the album and had an opportunity to purchase it, new releases attract only few additional
customers. In the extreme, if a firm would immediately reach all M consumers with its
album release, there is no (attention gathering) incentive to release a further single.
2.2 Albums as bundles of songs and forced unbundling in the iTunes-era
An album can be considered as a bundle of products: The songs it is composed of. A single
release therefore resembles (partial) unbundling by the firm, so that additional effects on
revenues must be taken into the firm’s calculations, in particular cannibalization and direct
revenue generation, which we outline below in an extension of our toy model of awareness.
Consider a situation in which both the album and a subset of its songs are available for
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purchase in the market in parallel. A consumer, upon becoming aware of the products,7
may then purchase either one unit of the album or a subset of the independently re-
leased singles or nothing, depending on which decision grants her the highest utility.8 For
simplicity and in line with empirical observations in the recorded music industry, in the
following discussion we assume that both prices of the album and of singles are fixed and
exogenous (Shiller and Waldfogel, 2011).9
Let the utility from purchasing nothing be 0 for all consumers. A consumer prefers the
album over nothing if ua(N) − P > 0, where ua(N) is the monetary equivalent of the
consumer’s utility derived from owning all songs on the album and P is the album price.
Therefore, consumers for whom this holds will buy the album when they become aware
of it. Cannibalization of album sales by a subset of songs SN (each priced at p) occurs, if
consumers of type i exist for whom Sn yields utility
ui(Sn)− p > ui(N)− P > 0. (1)
In this case, the consumer would prefer purchasing her favorite subset of singles at a
discount P − p to buying the entire album.10 The firm loses revenue from customer i due
to the fact that the singles were released.
On the other hand, consider a different type of consumer j who would never purchase
the entire album, since uj(N) − P < 0, but who would purchase a subset of singles,
since uj(Sn) − p > 0. Through unbundling, the firm can reach this type of customer
for additional sales; we refer to this second effect as direct revenue generation through
singles. For the first type of consumer, i, the firm suffers revenue losses from releasing,
or unbundling, singles from the album, for the second type, j, it generates additional
7According to the process set out in the previous section.
8Since the album includes the single, she will not buy both — we exclude behavioral aspects such as wanting
to own all releases of a given band. We further abstract from the fact that singles often constitute mini-
albums themselves, i.e. contain remixes and bonus songs (“B-sides”, referring to vinyl records that had
two sides to play on a turntable) that are not part of the original album, but may grant additional utility
to the consumer. For simplicity, we therefore assume in the remainder of the paper that a single always
comprises one song that is part of an album.
9A firm setting prices optimally would attempt to minimize cannibalization and maximize overall sales,
since variable costs are almost negligible in the industry. Optimal prices therefore depend on the shares
of consumers with different preferences. Further, with each single release, the optimal price of the album
would be (at least weakly) decreasing in optimum to offset cannibalization.
10Denoting the share of consumers of type-i as qi, we can write the expected losses via cannibalization for a
single release at tˆ as M
∫∞
tˆ
f(t, .)qi(P − p)dt.
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revenues. Finally, a third type of consumer, h, might always prefer to buy the entire
album, since
uh(N)− P > max{uh(Sn)− p, 0} (2)
Assume that consumers do not anticipate unbundling by the firm in their purchase deci-
sions.11 As long as only the album has been released, upon becoming aware of it, consumers
of type j decide not to purchase, while consumers of types i and h buy the album. By
releasing the single, the firm generates additional awareness, as discussed in the previous
section; it also starts selling singles to consumers of type j who would otherwise not have
purchased anything. But consumers of type i, who have not yet purchased the album, now
prefer buying the single over the whole album. The direct revenue effect gives the firm an
additional monetary incentive for releasing the single; but, internalizing cannibalization
there is an incentive to postpone the single release – by doing this, the firm can skim the
cream off the top first (i.e., sell the album to all interested consumers who become aware
of it prior to single release), without originally offering the opportunity to only pay for
the single.
This brings us to the central motivation for this paper: Due to the technological and social
development of the music industry, there are real-world ramifications to the theoretical
exercise of differentiating between a case in which singles only serve to generate attention
and the case in which bundling/unbundling considerations play a role for music firms. The
technological revolution that is responsible for this and that has changed listening and
purchasing behavior of music consumers for ever, is the forced unbundling of songs from
albums through the advent of the MP3-technology, which was made commercially feasible
through digital music stores, for which Apple’s iTunes is the dominant example. Due to
this revolution to the music market, firms by default make every individual song available
for purchase immediately upon releasing the original album. As a result, additional single
releases no longer generate additional revenues; cannibalization of album-sales through
11This is very much in the spirit of the model: In a market with thousands of products, if the consumer
fleetingly becomes aware of an album, for which no singles are currently released, she only decides whether
she is better off owning the album for the given price or not, but does not make the mental calculations
regarding the likelihood of her favorite songs being released in the future as singles.
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singles takes place ex initio, and therefore also no longer affects the release behavior of
firms. Therefore, in the iTunes-era, singles can be considered purely an attention gathering
device.
2.3 Competition and awareness with and without unbundling
An immediate implication of forced unbundling is that firms should release singles in
closer proximity to the album after digitization, all else equal, because they no longer take
cannibalization into account. In fact, as we lay out in more detail below, that the average
time between releases did decrease substantially, by more than 40 days, controlling for a
number of other factors. This number, by itself, is suggestive, but should not be over-
interpreted. Clearly, there are other forces at work (shifters to costs, consumer outside
options, different channels through which music has become available), which affect the
timing and optimal number of single releases, in addition to the forced unbundling outlined
above. In our empirical application, we will therefore study the effects of the digital
revolution in the music industry through the lens of competition. Albums that are released
at approximately the same time compete both for the attention and the budget of potential
customers, in their fight for space on screens and in shelves, top lists, and journalistic
media.
We consider two central channels through which the level of competition that an album
faces, denoted by C, affects the incentives of a firm to release attention and revenue
generating singles: First, competition is related to the rate at which attention decays. To
account for this, we expand f to f(t, C), such that ∂f(t,C)∂t is decreasing in C. The rate
at which consumers become aware of the product decreases faster in more competitive
markets, as illustrated in the right-hand panel of figure 1. In the framework outlined
above, this has two partially countervailing implications for the firm. On the one hand,
faster decay implies that the optimal frequency of releases should increase: With attention
reaching rock-bottom faster, the firm has an incentive to release its singles sooner. Parallel
to this, each single in expectation reaches fewer consumers. On the one hand, this implies
that there are more remaining potential buyers after any given release, which paves the way
for more singles to be released. On the other hand, and this is the countervailing effect, the
expected reach of a single is related to its potential profitability – if the expected generated
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revenues fall below the costs, it will not be released. Even from these simple considerations,
we are able to derive insights with regard to the shape of the problem. Assume that
at very low competition, the first single’s revenues are strictly above costs. Since the
profitability constraint is not binding, the countervailing affect will not immediately apply
as competition increases and we should first observe an increase in releases and frequency.
When competition reaches the level at which the profitability constraint becomes binding,
it starts to negatively affect the number of singles to be released in optimum (but not
the optimal frequency, i.e. time between releases, given that singles are released). In our
stylized model, for the setting in which there is forced unbundling, this immediately allows
us to derive predictions to be tested empirically:
Hypothesis 1 In the case with forced unbundling (the iTunes-era), the following should
hold: a) The optimal number of singles per album is first increasing in competition (while
the profitability constraint is not binding); at higher levels of competition (profitability
constraint becomes binding), the effect of competition on the optimal number may become
more negative. b) The frequency of releases is increasing in competition, i.e., the time
between releases is decreasing.
It should be noted that these predictions are not intuitively obvious: Notice that hypoth-
esis 1a indicates that when singles are purely awareness-raising, then the optimal number
of released singles should assume an inverse U-shape in competition. This result is nice,
because purely awareness-raising singles can be understood as a form of advertising – a
consistent finding in the advertising literature is that the intensity of advertising is inverse
U-shaped in competition.12 Further, tougher competition at the time of album release
could conceivably also lead firms to spread out single-releases to avoid bunching, which
would lead to a prediction opposing hypothesis 1b.
The second channel is related to the profitability of individual releases: Competition is a
determinant of the potential market size M for a given album, with M decreasing in the
level of competition. Consumers facing budget restrictions may be less likely to buy an
12This relationship has been established in the past using industry-level data (Greer, 1971; Cable, 1972;
Sutton, 1974; Brush, 1976; Strickland and Weiss, 1976; Martin, 1979; Buxton et al., 1984; Willis and
Rogers, 1998), though not at the level of individual products.
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album, the more comparable albums are on offer at the same time; or equivalently, com-
petition could force the price that can be optimally charged for the album (and released
singles) downwards.13 Competition thereby immediately decreases the direct revenue
effect of singles. This allows us an immediate prediction concerning the comparison of
the pre- and post-digitization regimes: The effect of competition on the optimal number
of single releases should be more negative prior to digitization, since the direct revenue ef-
fect no longer affects calculations in the forced-unbundling setting. Finally, we are able to
compare the timing decisions under the (strong) assumptions that relative prices of singles
and albums and the shares of consumers of different types are not affected by competi-
tion. Denoting the share of cannibalized consumers as qi, the losses from cannibalization
M
∫∞
tˆ f(t;C)qi(P − p)dt are decreasing in C. The incentive to increase the duration be-
tween releases due to cannibalization is therefore decreasing in the level of competition,
an effect that only holds pre-digitization. Again, we combine these observations into the
following empirical predictions:
Hypothesis 2 a) The effect of competition on the optimal number of singles should be
more negative for the pre-digitization era than the post-digitization era (direct revenue
effect). b) The effect of competition on the optimal frequency of releases should be stronger
for the pre-digitization era (cannibalization).
Note that hypthesis 2b depends on the strong assumptions stated above.
In the next step, we take this structure of hypotheses to the data. Clearly, there was no
clean switch from a purely physical to a purely digital distribution system in the music
industry, therefore we have to use an imperfect proxy. To delineate the two eras, we take
the introduction of Apple’s iTunes music store in 2003; from then on, consumers are easily
able to purchase any individual song from albums for the majority of albums at relatively
uniform prices. Previous, the dominant business model was the sale of full albums, with
unbundled singles as physical objects. As representative for the digitized era of music, we
therefore use the period since 2003, while for the “unbundling” era, we use data from the
period 1990-2002, in which the digital distribution channel played a very minor or no role
13Alternatively, consumers may on average buy the album at a later point in time due to competition, which
for impatient firms is equivalent to a decrease in M .
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Figure 2: Chart ranking and single releases
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Data source: itunescharts.net and musicbrainz.org.
with regard to labels’ direct revenues.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Illustrative example
The main focus of our empirical analysis is to investigate the effect of competition on the
number and frequency of actions firms take to make consumers aware of a product. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to show the effectiveness of those measures in terms of firm
performance. For illustrative purposes it is nevertheless useful to consider the examples of
sales dynamics of two different albums, measured as the average weekly chart rankings in
the UK iTunes store in figure 2. The first of these is a “typical” album in the sense that
it contains new songs by an artist, each of which might be released as a single: “Sorry for
Party Rocking” by US electronic-dance duo LMFAO in the left-hand panel. The second,
on the other hand, is a compilation – a collection of successful songs by different artists,
from which no singles are typically released: “BBC Radio 1’s Live Lounge, Vol. 5” in
the panel on the right. Both albums were released at roughly the same point in time and
entered the top 100 charts at similar positions. Single releases by LMFAO are depicted by
the vertical dashed lines — two singles in advance and two after the release of the album.
As expected, no singles were released from the compilation. The left graph suggests that
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chart positions of an album noticeably improve after the release of a single. This is both
in line with our theory as well as the findings of Hendricks and Sorensen (2009b) regarding
the effects of the releases of additional albums. On the other hand, the chart positions for
the compilation almost strictly decay after its release. Also, the charts retention time is
significantly shorter for the album without single releases.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Main datasource
Our main source of data is MusicBrainz, an online platform for music enthusiasts, which
contains user-generated information on roughly 15 million tracks from more than 1.3
million releases in over 60 countries from the 1950s until recently. The dataset provides
general facts regarding the artist, such as genre and label affiliation (from which we infer
whether the artist is signed with one of the major labels), but also detailed information
regarding individual releases. We match track titles of singles with track titles of albums
to identify single-album combinations. Based on these matches, we calculate the number
of singles that were released from an album and the time difference between the releases.14
The final dataset includes 17,752 albums, in 8 genres, from 55 countries,15 released between
1990 and 2010. We choose 1990 as the start of our observed period for two reasons. First,
we want to abstract from the changes to the music market induced by the introduction of
the Compact Disc.16 Second, we want to avoid sample selection that may arise because
older releases tend to be less represented in the MusicBrainz data as a result of its user-
generated nature (see the discussion in section 4.3.1). For similar reasons, we do not
extend our data beyond 2010. During the last years, the market for recorded music
has seen a transition towards more and more digital services that automatically carry
meta-information about releases (iTunes, Amazon, etc.), such that incentives for users to
contribute to MusicBrainz have dramatically decreased (see the Google search volume for
14We do not observe all entries in the database with the same level of detail. Unfortunately, for a significant
amount of albums, information is lacking (in most cases label, genre or release dates), so that observations
have to be dropped.
15Although we observe a large number of different countries, over 80% of the observations in our sample are
from the US (34%), UK (21%), Japan (14%), and Germany (12%).
16For example, the CD version of Michael Jackson’s 1987 album “Bad” featured a bonus track that was not
part of the Vinyl and Tape version. Rumor has it this was done to encourage consumers to switch to the
new technology, see http://tinyurl.com/njl8fza (in German).
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Figure 3: Number of singles per album, and average time between single releases
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“musicbrainz” in the right-hand-panel in figure 4 as an illustration). Subscription and
streaming services have recently gained momentum (IFPI Digital Music Report, 2013),
introducing changes to the advertising rationale of record labels that are beyond the scope
of this paper. To test the different parts of Hypothesis 1 (the forced unbundling case),
we use data from 2003 to 2010, the period during which digitization of the music market
took off. For Hypothesis 2, the comparison of the two cases, we juxtapose these results
with data from 1990 to (and including) 2002, the pre-digitized era.
The descriptive statistics in table A.1 show that we observe 8,543 albums and 3,927 singles
in the “CD-era”, and 9,209 albums and 4,489 singles in the “iTunes-era”. The average
album contains around 13 songs. The average number of countries in which an album in
our sample is released is 1.3.
3.2.2 Variables and descriptive statistics
To obtain the total number of singles released from an album, we match the track
titles of singles with track titles of albums of the same artist. Note that our algorithm
requires that single and album have to be released in the same country; albums released in
different countries can have varying counts of released singles. Matches indicate that the
same song was both included in an album and released as a single. This allows to attribute
singles to a particular album. We then count the number of corresponding singles for each
album.17 On average, we observe 0.35 and 0.42 singles per album, between 1990–2003,
17This method might produce some incorrect attributions of singles that were re-released on Best-of-albums.
Tracks on singles that were released more than once, are attributed to the earliest observed album. In
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and 2003–2010, respectively. For 15,781 albums (78%) in our full sample (1990–2010) we
do not observe corresponding singles.18 Among albums with at least one single release,
the average number of singles is 1.8. The distribution of this variable across 1990–2010 in
figure 3 shows that most albums only have one corresponding single. On the other hand,
a small number of albums generate five or more singles; the mean is around 2.19
We measure the time difference between releases as the number of days between
releases associated with an album. Note that this measure is only defined for albums
with at least one single release. More precisely, we count the days between subsequent
releases (including the album itself, in absolute terms) and take the average across the
“release group” defined by the album. We include the album itself, because, as argued in
the theoretical section, we also interpret the release of an album as a source of consumer
awareness, which then decays over time. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of time
differences in the sample 1990–2010. Note that a large share of releases are less than
20 days apart from each other, which indicates that record labels try to further trigger
album sales by releasing a single shortly before or after the album (compare the illustrative
example in figure 2).
We consider the music album as the main product of interest. One of the contributions
of this paper is that we can measure competition at the product-, i.e., album-level. We
assume that albums compete for the attention of consumers with other albums of the
same genre that are released at a similar point in time.20 The variable competition is
measured as the number of albums released within the same genre, in the same country
and the same month. On average this amounts to 5.5 new albums (there is no significant
difference between eras, see table A.1). One month is a relatively short time-window for
some cases, however, the initial album might be missing in our data which would result in upward biased
time-differences between the single and the corresponding album. We therefore disregard singles released
more than two years after the corresponding album. Our results do not depend on this two year-cutoff.
18Although we are confident that these are “true zeros”, because we applied manual checks and employed
high thresholds of data quality such as the exact release date and a parent label, we cannot rule out that
we miss some singles. However, this measurement error should not be systematic. Nevertheless note that
albums without singles are less likely to be issued by major labels, are older, feature more songs and
stem from artists that have already released albums in the past. Most importantly, however, there is no
significant difference regarding our competition measure.
19A famous example for an album that has released a large number of singles is Michael Jackson’s 1987
“Bad”. Seven out of eleven songs were released as a single in the US; the UK and Germany even saw nine
single releases.
20For example, most radio stations specialize according to music genres, so these albums are most likely to
compete for airplay.
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competing releases; as an important robustness check, we therefore propose two further
measures which broaden the window for competition by plus-minus one and two months,
respectively. The corresponding results are discussed in section 4.3.4.
To account for genres, we make use of user-generated “tags” for each release which describe
the style of music in the MusicBrainz data. We manually cluster these tags to derive a
unified notation of genres. We categorize albums along the eight genres Alternative,
Classical, Electronic, Hip Hop, Metal, Other, Pop, and Rock. Some albums, however,
might have tags which would qualify the release to be categorized into multiple genres21.
We eventually listed the album in the genre for which we counted the most corresponding
tags. For example, tags that we associated with the genre Electronic include house, techno,
electro, ambient, dub, dance, disco, and minimal. Besides using the genre information
to calculate the level of competition, we further use genre fixed effects to control for
unobserved heterogeneity in our regressions.
We further control for the track count of the album. The number of songs on an album
mechanically defines an upper bound of singles that can be released.
We observe both newcomers as well as artists who have released previous albums in our
sample. After the first release, an artist already has an established fan base and therefore
might have to release less singles to promote an album. To capture effects associated with
different stages of artists’ careers, we introduce the variable album history, which counts
the number of previous albums by the same artist in a country. To allow for non-linearity
(decreasing returns to popularity or a distinctive “debut album”-effect), we include this
information as categorical dummy variables in our regression models (we call this Album
History fixed effect in the results tables).
In a similar vein, one could expect advantages to larger firms in promoting their artists;
either through economies of scale and scope, more established connections to networks, or
recognizable brand names. The data provides information on the label under which the
single/album is released. A specific feature of the recorded music industry is that firms
usually have many subsidiaries (or at least brand names), which makes it challenging to
distinguish “independent” labels from entities that are under legal or economic control
21For example, tags for “Sorry for Party Rocking” by LMFAO are electronic, pop rap, club/dance, comedy
rap, dance-pop, electro, party rap, pop, pop/rock, dance, hip hop, and rap.
15
of one of the big four major labels, i.e., EMI, Sony BMG, Universal Music Group and
Warner Music Group. MusicBrainz provides a tree-structure that enables us (after a few
iterations) to determine the ultimate parent firm. Accordingly, we code each release by a
dummy variable indicating a major label affiliation. Measured this way, table A.1 shows
that the big four do control the majority of the market. Over time, though, the percentage
of major label albums decreases from almost 69% between 1990 and 2003 to around 61%
between 2003 and 2010.
We further control for seasonality by introducing calender month and year fixed effects.
This is important since particular events during the year drive sales, especially holidays
and the festival (open air concert) season, which in turn might affect marketing strategies
of albums and therefore single release behavior. Controlling for year fixed effects at least
partially addresses issues such as changes in costs and technology, e.g., due to developments
in the digital distribution of music (and corresponding growth in demand for digital music),
including changes in the importance of music piracy and filesharing (Waldfogel, 2010).
Table A.2 shows that most genres are relatively similar in terms of average number of
singles, time difference between releases and number of tracks. However, there is substan-
tial heterogeneity along multiple other dimensions. Classical albums release much less
singles; also the time difference between releases is lower. Still, competition in this genre
is intense. Competition is also particularly fierce in Pop, however, in this genre there are
more singles on average. Metal albums are less often issued by major record labels, the
highest share of major releases is in the Hip Hop category.
Pairwise correlations are reported in Table A.3. The unconditional overall correlation
between competition and the number of singles is positive. Further, competition and the
time between releases are negatively correlated, which suggests that with more competition
labels release singles faster. Major labels and albums with more tracks on average release
less singles. In the following section, we address our central questions in a regression
framework.
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3.3 Model specification
3.3.1 Regression models
We estimate two sets of OLS regressions to test our hypotheses. The baseline specifications
are as follows:
Ni,j,c,g = β0 + β1Cc,g + β2C
2
c,g + X
′
i,j,c,gθ + ε, (3)
∆Ti,j,c,g = β0 + β1Cc,g + X
′
i,j,c,gθ + ε, (4)
where N is the number of singles, ∆T is the time difference between releases, C denotes
our measure of competition, and the indices i,j,c and g denote artist, album, country and
genre, respectively. βk and θ are parameter (vectors) and the error term ε is assumed
to have the standard properties. The vector X′ comprises all control variables and fixed
effects introduced above. We run these regressions on a sample ranging from 2003 to 2010
to test hypothesis 1, and for the time-period 1990–2003 to test hypothesis 2, by comparing
the results for the two periods.
The strategic player in this setting is the record label, which coordinates release dates
of its artists. Decisions regarding albums from the same label might be correlated. We
therefore cluster standard errors at the level of the parent label.
3.3.2 Alternative estimation approaches
The OLS estimator may be problematic in our setting: Our dependent variables are trun-
cated (can never be negative), by definition, and are not continuous. One may alternatively
interpret the number of singles, or the number of days between releases as count data,
or as ordered choice variables. To address and control for these issues, we additionally
apply Tobit, Poisson and Ordered Logit models of the specifications (3) and (4). The
corresponding results are reported in section 4.3.5.
The results discussed in the main text of this paper are based on the OLS specification.
In the spirit of the theoretical arguments presented in section 2, we are mainly inter-
ested in interpreting the results in qualitative (coefficient signs) rather than quantitative
(coefficient size and forecasting) terms.
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Table 1: Results: Number of singles 2003-2010
DV: Total Number of Singles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Competition 0.0315*** 0.0290*** 0.0312*** 0.0130*** 0.0315***
(0.00471) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.00432) (0.00896)
Competition2 -0.00101*** -0.00134*** -0.00144*** -0.00101***
(0.000212) (0.000428) (0.000425) (0.000363)
Major Label 0.102*** 0.144* 0.146* 0.106 0.102
(0.0189) (0.0799) (0.0781) (0.0720) (0.0721)
Track Count -0.00761*** -0.00640*** -0.00727*** -0.00709*** -0.00761***
(0.00129) (0.00238) (0.00246) (0.00256) (0.00257)
Constant 0.516*** 0.326*** 0.433*** 0.524*** 0.516***
(0.0777) (0.0697) (0.114) (0.132) (0.130)
Fixed Effects
Month Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Genre Yes No No Yes Yes
Album History Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 10,630 10,630 10,630 10,630 10,630
R2 0.0795 0.0103 0.0162 0.0781 0.0795
Standard errors White Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
Note: Reported coefficients are OLS point estimates. Standard errors (in parentheses) in columns (2)–(5)
are clustered on the parent label level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Single releases with forced unbundling, “digitized era”, 2003–2010
The results of the OLS estimation for the effect of competition on number of singles
under forced unbundling are reported in Table 1. The first two columns show the results
for the regression with White-robust standard errors. Columns (3), (4), and (5) report
the results with gradually more fixed effects using clustered standard errors. Looking at
the coefficients of the month and year fixed effects (not reported), we find a slight trend
towards more singles over time but no significant pattern within each year. Furthermore,
artists that have released more previous albums do not systematically release more or less
singles than newcomers. Metal and Hip Hop are the only genres that show significant
differences with regard to the single release behavior. In those genres, on average, half a
single less is released compared to the base category Alternative.
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With regard to Hypothesis 1a, we find the following: The intensity of album competition
at release has a positive and significant effect on the number of released singles. Labels
do prefer to release more singles when they are confronted with more rival albums in their
market. We expected a non-linear component, since very strong competition may reduce
the potential market size for an album, and thereby the profitability of marginal singles
down below costs. Indeed, the squared term of competition is significant and negative.
Taken together, this suggests that firms release more singles as competition increases;
however, when competition exceeds a critical level, the effect of competition on single
releases becomes negative under forced unbundling.22 The critical level of competition,
depending on the specification, is around 12 simultaneous releases per month, which is
well above the average observed in our data. A formal test of an inverted U-shape against
the alternative of a linear relationship or U-shape (Lind and Mehlum, 2010), supports
the inverted U-shaped relationship within the observed range of competition (p < 0.001).
This result supports hypothesis 1a.
The coefficient for major label affiliation is positive but not significant in our preferred
specification shown in column (5) of table 1. Interestingly, the coefficient of track count
is negative, i.e. more songs on an album translate into fewer singles.
Next, we turn to Hypothesis 1b. Table 2 reports the results for the regression on re-
lease timing. Again, fixed effects are gradually introduced throughout the columns. In
accordance with our prediction, stronger competition at album release has a negative and
significant effect on the time between releases in all specifications. This suggests that labels
release their singles at a faster pace when confronted with more competition.23 This lends
support to our hypothesis 1b. Again, major labels do not differ in their release-timing
compared to independent labels. The coefficient of track count is positive and significant.
We additionally test for a non-linear relationship between competition and time between
releases. Column (5) in table 2 shows that the linear term of competition is still negative,
but no longer significant, due to higher standard errors, and the squared term is positive
and not significant. We therefore estimate an additional specification that leaves more
22A one standard deviation increase in competition results in a 0.122 increase in released singles. Given that
the mean count of released singles is roughly 0.42, this is a reaction of 29%.
23A one standard deviation increase in competition leads a label to release the single 6.4 days earlier. With
a mean time difference of 73 days, this is almost a reaction of 9%.
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Table 2: Results: Time between releases 2003-2010
DV: Average Time between Releases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Competition -1.407* -1.346** -1.461** -1.407*** -2.863 -3.541**
(0.768) (0.522) (0.556) (0.456) (1.912) (1.781)
Competition sq. 0.0914 0.128
(0.115) (0.109)
Major Label -7.539 -7.588 -9.761 -7.539 -7.596 -10.38
(6.448) (7.455) (7.276) (7.031) (6.979) (7.494)
Track Count 3.275** 2.991** 2.895** 3.275** 3.276** 2.708**
(1.308) (1.282) (1.219) (1.269) (1.270) (1.157)
Genre: Classical -34.13*
(19.40)
Constant 46.03 47.92*** 35.68* 46.03* 47.81* 47.62*
(35.28) (16.53) (20.03) (27.33) (27.93) (26.32)
Fixed Effects
Month Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Genre Yes No No Yes Yes No
Album History Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,415 2,415 2,415 2,415 2,415 2,415
R2 0.0370 0.00657 0.0156 0.0370 0.0372 0.0305
Standard errors White Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
Note: Reported coefficients are OLS point estimates. Standard errors (in parentheses) in columns (2)–(5)
are clustered on the parent label level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
variation in the data, by not including fixed effects for all genres, but only a dummy
indicating whether an observation is within the genre Classical or not. We chose this
definition, because descriptive statistics in table A.2 suggest that Classical is the most
likely outlier in terms of competition and release timing compared to all other genres. The
corresponding results reported in column (6) show a negative and significant coefficient
of competition, the squared term remains positive and not significant. This lends further
support to hypothesis 1b: the relationship between competition and the frequency of
releases is monotonically negative.
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Table 3: Number of Singles: Pre and Post Digitization
DV: Total Number of Singles
1990–2003 2003–2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Competition -0.00353*** -0.00780** 0.0130*** 0.0315***
(0.00118) (0.00347) (0.00432) (0.00896)
Competition2 0.000185 -0.00101***
(0.000125) (0.000363)
Major Label 0.0704 0.0704 0.106 0.102
(0.0657) (0.0658) (0.0720) (0.0721)
Track Count -0.00256* -0.00255* -0.00709*** -0.00761***
(0.00139) (0.00139) (0.00256) (0.00257)
Constant 0.418*** 0.420*** 0.524*** 0.516***
(0.148) (0.148) (0.132) (0.130)
Observations 9,440 9,440 10,630 10,630
R2 0.111 0.111 0.0781 0.0795
Standard errors Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered
Note: Reported coefficients are OLS point estimates. All specifications control for
month, year, genre and album history fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered on the level of parent labels. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
4.2 The effects of forced unbundling - contrasting results to the “CD-era”,
1990–2003
To test hypotheses 2a and 2b, we run the same regressions on the sample ranging from 1990
until 2003 and then compare coefficients. We begin with discussing the results concerning
the number of single releases in columns (1) and (2) of table 3. We include the results
obtained from an estimation on the sample between 2003 and 2010 in columns (3) and (4)
(same as columns 4 and 5 in table 1) to facilitate the comparison.
Regarding the main control variables, we find that the effect of major label affiliation and
the number of tracks on the album remains stable when moving back in time; both in
terms of significance and the direction of the effect.
What we are mainly interested in is how single release behavior of firms is associated
with competition, when the single is still an independent revenue generating product
to be unbundled from the album. It turns out that prior to digitization, the behavior
of firms was fundamentally different than after: Pre-2003, effect of competition on the
optimal number of singles released is negative and significant in column (1). Testing
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Table 4: Time between releases: Pre and Post Digitization
DV: Time between releases
1990–2003 2003–2010
(1) (2)
Competition -1.613 -1.407***
(1.660) (0.456)
Major Label 0.518 -7.539
(12.26) (7.031)
Track Count 2.795*** 3.275**
(0.970) (1.269)
Constant 85.63*** 45.17
(23.74) (27.36)
Observations 1,874 2,415
R2 0.0523 0.0370
Standard errors Clustered Clustered
Note: Reported coefficients are OLS point estimates.
All specifications control for month, year, genre and al-
bum history fixed effects. Standard errors (in paren-
theses) are clustered on the level of parent labels.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
for a non-linear relationship in column (2), the results suggest a purely linear, negative,
and significant effect of competition. Clearly, the coefficients in the two eras are highly
significantly different. This result strongly supports our predictions derived in hypothesis
2a. When the singles were still independent products, the direct revenue effect implied
that more competition made single releases much less attractive for the firm.
We compare the effects of competition on the time between releases for the two eras in table
4. We find that the coefficients are similar, both in terms of magnitude and direction and
slightly larger in the pre-iTunes era. For the time before 2003, though, the standard error
is substantially higher, so that the coefficient is no longer significant. We interpret this as
implying that the strong ceteris-paribus conditions regarding the shares of consumers and
the relative prices of album and singles required to derive Hypothesis 2b do not hold, and
therefore the regression is noisier for the earlier era. Interestingly, the constant is almost
twice as large in the CD era as in the iTunes era, i.e., labels waited twice as long to release
a new single, which is in line with an incentive to avoid cannibalization of sales.
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4.3 Robustness checks
In the following sections, we address a number of potential issues in terms of data, alter-
native explanations and methods.
4.3.1 Data quality and completeness
The data, on which our study is based is user-generated. MusicBrainz relies on anonymous
users supplying inputs into an online database without remuneration; nevertheless, it had
managed to become the industry quasi-standard for online music-databases in the first
decade of the 21st century, cooperating with, e.g., the BBC to supply meta-data on songs
in their program.24 Towards the end of the decade and in the subsequent years, factors
such as the rising popularity of streaming services – each equipped with databases of their
own – resulted in a decreasing popularity of the MusicBrainz project, as can bee seen in
the righthand panel of figure 4. Due to this, we limit our sample to observations prior to
and including 2010.
An important issue to address is the selection of observations into the database. We observe
all data required for our analysis for about 20,000 albums; including the extremely long tail
in the music business, the full figure of publications in the period we consider easily exceeds
one million. As such, we are dealing with a truncated version of the distribution. This
cannot be avoided.25 In fact, since the hypotheses that we derive depend on the observed
albums actually competing for customer attention, the (low) popularity threshold of entry
into a user-generated database may contribute to ensuring that the competition measured
by our approach is actually relevant.
What we further want to ensure is that our competition measure varies in accordance
with the actually occurring competition in the market. To check if the number of album
releases observed by us is related to the true number of releases, we use data from the
Billboard 200 list, the most influential album charts in the United States. We count the
number of new chart entrants each month and correlate this with the number of monthly
new releases in the United States using the MusicBrainz database. The left-hand-panel of
24See http://blog.musicbrainz.org/2007/06/28/the-bbc-partners-with-musicbrainz-for-music-metadata/
25To compare: ?, using sales-data and searching for artists for whom one debut-album is observed using the
Billboards charts between 1993 and 2002 are able to include 888 albums from three genres in their study
to derive their results.
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Figure 4: Sample representativeness: Musicbrainz, Billboard 200, Google Trends
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Data source: billboard.com, musicbrainz.org, Google Trends.
figure 4 shows both variables in a scatterplot with the corresponding linear fits. The figure
shows that while we do not observe the entire population of new releases, the correlation
is high and the trends match each other well.
4.3.2 Endogenous release timing and album quality
Other studies, such as Hendricks and Sorensen (2009a) consider the album release date to
be exogenous. On the other hand, if there are focal points for album publication during
the year (e.g., prior to the holiday season), then this could enter the calculus of firms,
which might give rise to an alternative explanation for parts of the pattern that we observe.
Assume that higher-quality albums have more potential singles and are likely to fare better
against tougher competition. Then firms may publish these at the focal points during the
year, while placing their weaker albums at times when they face less competition. If it
is quality that is driving the number of singles, then this would also explain parts of the
relationship between competition and number of singles released observed by us.
To explore the relevance of this effect, we turn to an independent website which aggregates
the quality assessments of released albums to calculate the metascores for albums (Meta-
critic.com). This metascore is used as an indicator of quality for the releases, and ranges
from 0 to 100. It provides quality information on more than 5100 albums between 1999
and 2010. The data provided information on the artist, genre, album title, and release
date.
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Figure 5: Metacritic scores of albums released during different seasons
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Note: The solid line gives the average Metacritic score for 5100 music albums,
released during the years 1999–2010. The gray area indicates the corresponding
5th to 95th percentile range. The horizontal axis is the release month independent
of release year. Data source: metacritic.com
If the alternative explanation were to hold, then we would expect better quality albums
to be released in months with higher competition and worse quality albums to be released
in lulls. Figure 5 shows the distribution of Metascores dependent on the release month.
The mean of scores stays remarkably constant at 70 while the interval between the 5th
and the 95th percentile lies roughly 15 points above/below the mean. The only support
for the alternative hypothesis is only that during December (i.e., too late for the holiday
season) the lower bound slides downwards; the mean, however, is unaffected.
The graph suggests that the concern of lower quality albums selecting into particular
months does not find much support in the data. However, one might still argue that
labels, while not selecting particular months, wait until competition is lower. We would
then expect to find a positive correlation of our measure of competition and Metascores,
as lower quality albums should select into phases of low competition.
To investigate this, we match Metacritic to Musicbrainz, using the criteria artist name and
release date (month-year). We are able to find 812 albums in both datasets. Because the
majority of albums we observe in the combined sample are recent releases not older than
three years, we do not run regressions on this data, but stick to a descriptive analysis.
The left-hand-panel of figure 6 shows how Metascores are distributed given the level of
competition, along with a linear fit line. Although some patterns are visible, we only find
a very small correlation between Metascores and competition. This suggests no convincing
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Figure 6: Metacritic scores, competition, and number of singles
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Data source: musicbrainz.org and metacritic.com, based on 812 album matches.
evidence in favor of the concern of strategic release timing conditional on album quality.
Any remaining effect is likely to be minor and should be captured by season fixed-effects
in our approach.
4.3.3 Endogenous popularity of genres and artists
There is a subtle effect to consider when using the number of rival albums as a driver
of single releases which is related to the (potentially faddish) popularity of entire genres.
If genres are, temporarily, en vogue then it would be reasonable to observe more albums
being released as music firms jump onto the “band waggon”. If albums from popular
genres release more singles ipso facto, then genre popularity might drive both competition
and single releases.
We use data from Google Trends to take this into account at least to some extent. This
yields a time-series with the weekly search volume of the terms “alternative music”, “clas-
sical music”, “electronic music”, “hip hop music”, “metal music”, “pop music”, and “rock
music”, relative to the search term with the highest volume. By simultaneously querying
search volumes for different genres, the results are indexed according to the most fre-
quently searched term. That is, if “hip hop music” was the most popular, querying for
“rock music” gives us the search volume relative to the volume of “hip hop music”, etc.
We use this as a measure for the relative popularity of genres.
Google Trends data is only available starting from 2004, therefore a direct match comes at
the cost of losing many observations and we can only perform this exercise for the forced
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unbundling era – which is the relevant case, because only here the positive relationship
between competition and single releases could be found. Columns (1) and (3) of table A.4
show the results of regressions similar to those above. The popularity of the genre has
no significant effect on the number of singles; the effect of competition remains positive
and significant; the effect is even larger than in our preferred regression. Also, in column
(3) we find a remaining negative and significant effect of competition on the time between
releases.
Building on an analogous argument, single release behavior could be driven by an artist’s
popularity. To control for this alternative explanation, we use data from Wikipedia.
We proxy for artist popularity with the logarithmized cumulative clicks on the artist’s
Wikipedia page in the month of album release. This approach, however, comes with two
major limitations. First, we only observe clicks on Wikipedia pages starting in January
2008. Consequently, we lose all album releases up until December 2007. Second, several
of the artists in our sample are not popular enough to have their own Wikipedia page.
Therefore we do not have Wikipedia clicks for a substantial number of artists. We set
their popularity to the minimum level as we interpret the lack of a Wikipedia page as an
indication of low popularity of an artist.
The results are reported in model (2) for the number of singles and (4) for the time
between releases in Table A.4. The findings suggests that artist popularity has a positive
and significant effect on the number of singles released. However, the main and squared
effect of competition remain as in the preferred regression which lends further support to
our hypothesis.
4.3.4 A wider perspective on competition
As discussed in the definition of variables, it could be considered too restrictive to argue
that the label only responds to competition in the month of the release. We consider two
additional definitions for the variable competition; one with the number of albums from
the same genre released in the same month plus the month before and after and one with
competition measured in the release month plus the two months before and after. The
results in table A.5 remain qualitatively unchanged. The estimation results therefore do
not depend on our definition of the time horizon for competition.
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4.3.5 Alternative estimation approaches
As detailed in section 3.3.2, one may have concerns regarding the estimation method.
Violations of OLS assumptions may produce results that are qualitatively different to those
obtained using other estimators, which may fit our set-up better. We therefore estimated
Tobit and Poisson regressions for both dependent variables as well as an ordered Logit
model to explain the number of singles released (Table A.6). The results are comparable
in terms of coefficient sign and significance.
5 Conclusions and Implications
The music industry is a poster-child for a sector that has been fundamentally affected by
the digitization of the economy. In this paper, we focus on one important aspect that
helps us better understand this process: The different motives for music firms to unbundle
individual songs from their albums, i.e., to release singles. As Hendricks and Sorensen
(2009b) have shown, customer information and the lack thereof play an important role
in determining albums. This makes awareness for albums a crucial commodity in the
industry. Single releases, which, for example, affect the airtime dedicated to artists, are
one of the central ways to manage awareness for albums. In a simple framework, we
show how competition should affect the incentives to release singles if this is the sole
motive of firms – with the optimal number of singles following a U-shape in competition.
Moreover, we allow for other motives for single releases, in particular the unbundling-
result which makes singles independent generators of revenues. The “experiment” that
we empirically focus on is the forced unbundling through digitization – both completely
involuntarily through the introduction of the mp3-format and the rise of (at the time
illegal) filesharing platforms, such as Napster, as well as through new business models
such as Apple’s iTunes-service. In the digital era, approximated by the time after 2002,
unbundling motives should therefore no longer play a role (at least to the same extent) and
therefore, the effects of album competition on the single release behavior of firms should
differ across the two eras. What we find empirically strongly supports this interpretation:
Prior to 2003, competition has a purely negative effect on the number of singles released
by firms – a single is an independent, revenue generating product. In the digital era, this
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is inverted and we observe the inverse U-shape in competition that is generally associated
with advertising efforts. Also, singles are released in closer succession to each other: In
the information era, singles have become a measure to raise and maintain attention. In
this way, they have managed to escape becoming obsolete: In fact, the average number of
single releases per album that we observe is not remarkably different across the two eras.
We use a rich, unique dataset covering the music industry which has not been previously
utilized in this fashion: With data from the online platform MusicBrainz, we are able to
observe exogenous variation in the level of competition at album release within a genre
to estimate its effect on the number of and intervals between single releases. In this way,
we can study the interactions between competition at the level of individual products
(albums) and measures to increase their commercial success.
Clearly, the nature of our data is associated with certain limitations. Using user-generated
data, there are always some doubts concerning the data quality of individual entries. We
carry out some robustness checks utilizing other, independent sources of data to rule out
certain competing explanations. Further, while it allows us to observe variation at the
product level, our measure of competition (number of releases in the same genre in the
same month/surrounding months) is by necessity a crude one. One could argue that this
is not the relevant set of competing products that labels take into account. It would be
interesting future research to more closely study which products are the truly relevant
competition in settings like the music industry, in which such a plethora of products
compete for consumer attention. Again, we try to address alternative explanations using
external data and by using different time-windows to define the competition set.
Beyond demonstrating the effects of forced unbundling through digitization on the release
behavior of music firms, our paper contributes to the strand of literature concerned with
how firms market their products and compete for attention. First, our finding of the
non-linear effect of competition on amount of advertising adds product-level evidence to
the classic literature (Sutton, 1974; Reekie, 1975; Rees, 1975; Brush, 1976; Ehrlich and
Fisher, 1982) which studied competition only at the industry level. Our findings provide
further evidence that consumer awareness of products affects sales in certain industries
(Cai et al., 2009; Hendricks and Sorensen, 2009a; Tucker and Zhang, 2011; Hendricks et al.,
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2012) and shows that firms do take this into account in their strategy. Moreover, it adds
to the literature on competition and product introduction (Bayus et al., 1997; Boyd and
Bresser, 2008; Ethiraj and Zhu, 2008; Lee et al., 2000); it also shows, how the introduction
of products (singles) was affected by digitization.
Finally, focusing on the music industry, our results indicate why music labels still choose
to release singles, even as their direct revenue generating role has receded due to the
digitization of the music market and the corresponding — almost total — unbundling of
purchasable tracks from albums: Single releases still play an important role in generating
consumer attention for the underlying album. Looking to the future, one of the central
current trends in the listening behavior of consumers, individualized music streaming,
may undermine one of the central channels through which singles generate attention. If
the importance of radio airplay continues to decline, affecting the programme planning
of stations through single releases will become an increasingly futile venture. Therefore
Spotify may succeed where iTunes failed: Turning single releases into a truly unprofitable
sideshow. The Loudness War, however, is likely to continue on different battlefields, such
as automated or user-generated recommendations on online-platforms, i.e. blog posts
(Dewan and Ramaprasad, 2012), playlists on Deezer and Spotify; likes, shares and retweets
on Facebook and Twitter; videos on YouTube (Kretschmer and Peukert, 2014), and by
continuing to turn live performances back into the lifeblood of the music industry (Tonon
et al., 2014).
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Appendix
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics
1990–2003 2003–2010
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of Singles 0.349 0.851 0 6 0.422 0.946 0 6
Time 87.797 147.228 0 728 73.001 132.645 0 728
Competition 5.291 5.116 1 36 5.543 4.537 1 31
Major Label 0.686 0.464 0 1 0.606 0.489 0 1
Track Count 12.838 4.935 1 50 12.905 4.752 1 50
Countries per Album 1.298 0.668 1 10 1.395 0.790 1 10
Observed Albums 8,543 9,209
Observed Singles 3,927 4,489
34
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics by genre
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Alternative Metal
Number of Singles 0.358 0.789 0 4 0.239 0.644 0 4
Time 86.725 154.119 0 665 88.736 149.615 0 728
Competition 1.421 0.743 1 4 2.376 1.513 1 8
Major Label 0.526 0.501 0 1 0.288 0.453 0 1
Track Count 13.384 3.488 7 31 10.894 3.118 2 33
Classical Other
Number of Singles 0.024 0.230 0 5 0.338 0.880 0 6
Time 49.667 83.367 0 366 80.761 147.607 0 704
Competition 7.805 6.493 1 31 5.205 3.314 1 13
Major Label 0.555 0.497 0 1 0.580 0.494 0 1
Track Count 11.800 5.394 2 42 14.115 5.651 2 50
Electro Pop
Number of Singles 0.591 1.010 0 5 0.713 1.204 0 6
Time 87.390 149.945 0 721 58.882 114.542 0 700
Competition 2.648 1.788 1 11 5.296 3.622 1 18
Major Label 0.465 0.499 0 1 0.706 0.456 0 1
Track Count 12.592 5.070 1 49 13.090 3.615 2 36
Hip Hop Rock
Number of Singles 0.522 1.004 0 6 0.622 1.084 0 6
Time 75.233 112.755 0 634 70.344 129.783 0 707
Competition 3.780 2.842 1 13 7.208 4.816 1 23
Major Label 0.771 0.420 0 1 0.712 0.453 0 1
Track Count 14.751 3.663 3 44 12.146 3.523 2 46
Note: Data refer to the period 2003–2010.
Table A.3: Pairwise correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Number of Singles 1.0000
(2) Time -0.3364 1.0000
(0.0000)
(3) Competition 0.0832 -0.0468 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0215)
(4) Major Label -0.0563 -0.0239 0.0521 1.0000
(0.0056) (0.2401) (0.0105)
(5) Track Count -0.0467 0.0636 -0.0587 0.0680 1.0000
(0.0218) (0.0018) (0.0039) (0.0008)
Note: p-values in parentheses. Data refer to the period 2003–2010.
35
Table A.4: Robustness checks: genre and artist popularity
DV: Number of Singles DV: Time between Releases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Competition 0.0338*** 0.0372*** -1.291*** -1.105
(0.00919) (0.0124) (0.406) (0.887)
Competition2 -0.00109*** -0.00126*
(0.000353) (0.000649)
Major Label 0.112 0.0435 -12.56* -12.59
(0.0731) (0.0684) (6.880) (8.973)
Track Count -0.00881*** -0.00693** 3.960*** 3.756***
(0.00289) (0.00325) (1.343) (1.338)
Genre: Google Trends -0.000746 -0.0684
(0.00148) (0.439)
Artist: Wikipedia Clicks 0.135*** -4.346***
(0.00786) (0.652)
Constant 0.452*** 0.373*** 62.56 72.36
(0.157) (0.130) (47.79) (43.55)
Observations 9,296 5,609 2,589 1,215
R2 0.0784 0.243 0.0433 0.0829
Note: Reported coefficients are OLS point estimates. All specifications control for month, year, genre
and album history fixed effects. Model (1) and (3) control for the Google Trends statistics of the
particular genres. Models (2) and (4) control for popularity measured as the logarithm of cumulative
clicks on Wikipedia for the artist in the month of album release. Standard errors are clustered on the
level of parent labels. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.5: Robustness check: time to measure competition
DV: Number of Singles DV: Time between Releases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Competition ±1 0.0155*** -1.050***
(0.00365) (0.283)
Competition ±1 sq. -0.000189***
(0.0000528)
Competition ±2 0.0106*** -0.845***
(0.00258) (0.242)
Competition ±2 sq. -0.0000863***
(0.0000292)
Major Label 0.102 0.106 -7.564 -7.356
(0.0731) (0.0735) (6.928) (6.809)
Track Count -0.00758*** -0.00733*** 3.348** 3.467***
(0.00266) (0.00267) (1.279) (1.273)
Constant 0.549*** 0.516*** 47.59* 49.90*
(0.147) (0.139) (28.38) (28.48)
Observations 10,494 10,404 2,400 2,390
R2 0.0816 0.0820 0.0393 0.0406
Note: Reported coefficients are OLS point estimates. All specifications control for month, year
genre and album history fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the level of parent labels.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.6: Robustness checks: alternative estimation methods
DV: Number of Singles DV: Time between Releases
Tobit Poisson Ordered Logit Tobit Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Competition 0.143*** 0.0795*** 0.0896*** -2.933** -0.0195***
(0.0261) (0.0241) (0.0241) (1.329) (0.00663)
Competition2 -0.00522*** -0.00261* -0.00327**
(0.00157) (0.00136) (0.00142)
Major Label 0.595*** 0.250 0.441* -6.502 -0.0975
(0.0808) (0.203) (0.227) (10.81) (0.0884)
Track Count -0.0435*** -0.0239*** -0.0263*** 6.066*** 0.0378***
(0.00780) (0.00887) (0.00843) (1.855) (0.0137)
Constant -2.041*** -0.854*** -73.32 3.945***
(0.339) (0.327) (56.02) (0.369)
σ 2.696*** 201.7***
(0.0413) (5.860)
Cut1 1.316***
(0.407)
Cut2 2.278***
(0.399)
Cut3 3.076***
(0.410)
Cut4 3.899***
(0.417)
Cut5 5.177***
(0.440)
Cut6 6.730***
(0.499)
Observations 10,630 10,630 10,630 2,415 2,415
Log Likelihood -8717.0 -9148.7 -8057.9 -9570.9 -198903.2
Note: All specifications control for month, year, genre and album history fixed effects. Model (1) are Tobit
coefficients with a lower bound of zero, Model (2) is a Poisson regression and (3) estimates an Ordered Logit
model. Columns (4) and (5) estimate a Tobit with lower bound of zero and Poisson model, respectively.
Standard errors are clustered on the level of parent labels; except for the tobit models which do not allow for
clustering. Here, we use robust standard errors instead. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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